Showing posts with label Ming. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ming. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

Lilly Project (Blog 13), Clifford Odets' Death Mask



Lilly Archive Project
Justin, Ming, Derek, Natalie

Introduction

We went to the Lilly Library and looked at items from three collections: the puzzle collection, Clifford Odets, and Edgar Allan Poe. In flipping through the papers describing the Odets collection, the words “Death Mask” jumped out at us: just those two words on a single line, no other description or explanation. Naturally we were drawn to this intriguing entry. And when the librarian asked us if we wanted to see it, we all said “yes, please.” We asked, thinking it might be some kind of wooden mask used in a foreign country. Instead, we had found a plaster death mask of the deceased Clifford Odets himself (see Figure 1), which was made at his death in 1963 (he died August 14, of cancer, at age 57). Clifford Odets was famous for plays such as Waiting for Lefty (1935) and the screenplay of Sweet Smell of Success (1957). This post has been written in parts connected only loosely together.

Death Mask of Clifford Odets (1957); Photograph by Derek DiMatteo.
Figure 1. Death Mask of Clifford Odets (1957)
Photograph by Derek DiMatteo.
  
Justin’s thoughts

‘Death Mask’ – these are two words one does not often associate with the archival remains of a little-known playwright housed in a Midwestern university library. Yet they appear, unaccompanied by additional text, in the “Guide to the Clifford Odets Papers in the Lilly Library.” Seeing the words ‘death mask’ immediately conjures visions of ritual performance masks purchased during global travels or perhaps images of spooky disguises used for costuming in a non-realistic play. Thus, it is rather a surprise when a Lilly librarian brings to you a cardboard box graffitied with magic marker that holds voluminous bubble wrap enveloping a stark white plaster cast of a deceased man’s face. As soon as the bright visage is pulled from its cardboard home, romantic visions quickly vanish and one realizes that the term ‘death mask’ refers, quite literally, to a plaster reproduction of a person’s face made shortly after death and just prior to interment. The experience is best described as ‘creepy’ and invites a host of questions in regards to the mask’s creation as well as queries concerning its inclusion in the university archive. 

A death mask is an oddly difficult archival object in which to ‘dance’ academically, especially in the absence of any accompanying data concerning its creation or previous homes. It is solely evidence of the living, breathing corpus that is no longer present to interact or to perform. The death mask functions much like film or photography works for performance: it serves as evidence for what was once present, but is now lost forever – that which can only be faultily re-membered through memory, description, and visual representations. As Peggy Phelan notes, “Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility –in a maniacally charged present – and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and control”(Phelan 148). The human body mirrors performance, as neither remain present ad infinitum, but both are lost to a perpetual present from which they necessarily disappear. 

The death mask is a reminder of the body that once was extant, but how adequately does it ‘ghost’ the person it represents? Andrew Sofer reminds us that “spectators bring associations from previous productions with them to the theater, and that these ‘ghosts’ color their experience of the current performance” (63). ‘Ghosts’ in real, lived experience work in the same way: associations from prior experience are conjured, creating a specter of what preceded. But what prior experience is recalled when an unwitting student stumbles across the ‘death mask’ of Clifford Odets in a search of the Lilly Library? The mask is a representation of a largely unknown man who once lived, but does it provide information beyond the fact that he indeed lived? A ‘ghost’ depends on memory. It is not only important how accurate or faulty a memory may be (as evidenced in Phelan’s discussion of Sophie Calle’s installations), but also that a memory exists. Without memory is there anything to ‘ghost’? If a ghost appears, but there is no memory, is the imagination just playing tricks? Thus, how problematic is imagination?

Ming’s thoughts

So, Odets's death mask.  A plaster mask taken after the mortician spruced Odets up and before he was interred...well, in our language, after death, “he” becomes “his body”, “the body”, or “the corpse”--so, before his body was interred?  Which distinction brings me to one of the themes I've visited before when I discussed literary translation and performance studies: the two disciplines have in common a tendency to use violent metaphors to describe rendering. With his death mask, Odets is rendered here, but how many layers are there to the palimpsest? The man, who after death is no longer, in English, “the man” but “the man’s body”. The body, the mask, the mortician, the loved one who presumably asked that the mask be made. Then outward: every box it's been in, the journey it traveled to the Lilly, everyone who has seen it, which now includes me. To know that this very plaster lay on a dead man's face, to look upon the shape his mourners must have looked upon if he had an open casket...that his face looks calm does little to calm my own nerves. Why was I getting the willies? The mask was made in 1963; not too long ago. But because the process is not a culturally familiar one to me, I felt odd seeing this man's death mask. Mask-layer notwithstanding, there seemed to be a layer missing, a layer of rendering that might have made it acceptable: oil on canvas, rendering his likeness; a needle on a record, rendering his voice. In the absence of as much rendering as I found normative, not enough of it had the effect of inserting sacrilegious me into a sacred space: I felt as I looked at the mask the way I might feel stumbling into a church where someone who thinks herself alone is praying audibly.  And yet, it was something made to be seen, to record how he looked—and look I did, with the willies and also a sense of fascination. Harris brings up the concept of “fetish” early in “Palimpsested Time”, touching on Marx's thought that fetishism is “guilty of 'magical' thought, insofar as it allegedly anthropomorphizes inert objects by lending agency to them” (6). If this "magicking" of objects is a crime, most of the authors we've read recently have committed it. Agency is lent to inanimate objects up the wazoo in our recent readings, not least the ones touching on photography.  I see every photo as a ("polychronic"?) palimpsest with infinite layers, among which linger the time it is taken, and every time it is seen, every person who sees it and touches it, and underneath it all the person who took it and the subject it objectified. Then there are Geertz's “thick descriptions” of the objects involved, the discursive, cultural, and historical lives to which the subject in the photo and the subject of the photo each belong. It goes on and on. Accordingly, our readings of late have nodded again and again to the stories we tell ourselves and each other about heretofore inanimate objects, and the codes of repression and exhibition enforced and reified by our “dance with things”, by our decision to see (or, Wexler would remind us, not see) them as active agents. Harris contends on page 16 that matter need not be “animate” to be necessary to the temporality of supercession or to that of explosion, perhaps suggesting that matter therefore is an undeniable agent in whatever reality there is to a construct of time.  I wonder, was Odets's mask made in order to negate time?  Negate time the way Debord's spectacle is “a negation of life which has invented a visual form for itself”? Why are all these theorists proclaiming that an inert thing can have a suppressive (or, for that matter, an animating) effect on abstractions?  How can an object negate time or life; how can an object invent?  These theorists are looking at a thing and endowing it with agency in the (admit it) fictive textual world they create, the way Brecht endows epic theater with agency when he says it “admits it is a demonstration” or the way Blank and Jensen do the same when they refer to what a play “asks of us”. What does Odets's death mask ask of us? I'm still not sure, but Harris might agree that whatever its scriptive function the mask is a palimpsest in that it is undeniably a “collation of diverse inscriptions that accrue over time”: perhaps inscribed by the man's face, the mortician, even viewers who knew him and the viewers who, like me, experience the visage as an archival item and not a reminder (17).  Harris might also agree that, as a palimpsest, the mask is a “complex, polychronic assemblage of material agents”: plaster, mortician, face, corpse, viewers, graffitied cardboard box.

Derek’s thoughts

Polychronic assemblage, indeed. The Odets Death Mask “both is a material presence and it encodes other material and immaterial presences” (Stallybrass, qtd in Harris, 9). Its material presence is quite literally that of a plaster mask created in 1957. The other material presence it encodes is the physical features of Clifford Odets’ face at the time of his death. The primary immaterial presence (at least for those who knew Odets) is perhaps akin to what Sofer calls the “felt absence” (67), i.e. the memory of a living, corporeal, walking/talking Clifford Odets. As Harris notes, “these other presences are…the memorial marks of the past”, and are emphatically not of the present, and thus the mask is “out of time with itself” or “untimely” (10), inhabiting the present moment but also “alien to and out of step with it” (11). Because of these other presences, because of its untimeliness, the plaster mask connotes “the persistence of the past in the present” (11). The mask does so by encoding the corporeal past, allowing it to persist into the present: Clifford Odets’ facial features have been written into the plaster, an act of supersession. But at the same time the mask resists “absorption into a homogenous present” (11). After all, we are gathered here in the Lilly Library, without having known Odets or having any memory of him. As scriptive objects, masks invite the viewer to put them on, but this perversely scriptive impulse is resisted when we know this is a death mask. Instead, the mask takes on a spiritual or sacred scriptiveness that invites viewers to activate their memories of Clifford Odets. But we who never knew Odets cannot conjure a memory of him as we look at the mask. So for those who see the mask without any memory of Odets, other immaterial presences are encoded: one of imagination (spectator is invited to imagine a living Odets) and one of ghosting (spectator is reminded of other deaths, of the faces of loved ones seen at wakes/funerals past). This explosion of memory and imagination shatters the integrity of the plaster mask as memory “punctures the illusion” of the mask’s material “wholeness or finality” (16). In this way, the juxtaposition of the highly detailed—indeed, the life-like—mask with the irruption of imagination and/or memory of the “dust of the past” allows the material and immaterial presences to “converse” in the “temporality of conjunction” (16). The mask is of 1957, but our gaze works on the plaster text to read the features and bring it to life. 

Natalie’s thoughts

It would seem that this death mask is an excellent example of Phelan’s key claim about performance, that it only becomes itself through disappearance: the mask performs the memory and the absent body of Odets, as others have mentioned, only in the wake of his death, in the disappearance of the life that animates the face captured here. I think the disturbed and unsettled feeling that others have described as accompanying seeing such a thing has very much to do with Phelan’s claim and Ming’s sense that there was a “layer missing.” What the death mask seems to promise is exactly what it cannot give, contact with the material body. The “needle” of a recording of his voice or the “oil” in a painting of him would give concrete elements for us to hold on and attach ourselves to in the representation of this man—we’d know we were only getting a representation, but having other materialities would provide other points of contact. But the death mask DID made contact with the face—it actually touched it, yet it can never allow us that same experience, or even a more mediated form of it like a painting or recording could. I think that it is not simply the loss of the body here, then, but the endlessly impossible desire to do just what the mask would seem to be doing—making contact with the material body—that is being performed by this object. I think it also promises to surrender the substance of death to us but can’t give that over either—not just his death, but any death, the concrete experience of death in general. In doing so it makes us witnesses to a performance that we can never actually see.

If this object is indeed performing, then it matters in what context it takes place. Justin has already pointed out how some responses that might be called forth by the mask can’t be elicited if the viewer doesn’t have certain information. Certainly, the functions death masks used to serve—as physical remainders of the deceased in the absence of photography or genetic profiles to be archived not just by the family but also by the state, and as guides to painting portraits of the deceased—are either outdated or unlikely to be called upon now. I think it’s fair to say that if you don’t know who this person is, then if this mask is prominently displayed in a museum, library, or university building—which is apparently where many of these masks end up—another aspect of its “scriptedness” might concern generating an impulse to create and consult an archive about them. If the mask is just displayed in the glass case of a university library with the person’s name and date of birth and death, it suggests their importance to a certain “we” that the viewer is excluded from without knowing the referent. This might seem obvious, but I think it’s important to consider the ways in which this might be displayed now, and how the contours of the performance would change in other contexts.

Clifford Odets, book photo and death mask; Photographed by Derek DiMatteo.
Figure 2. Clifford Odets, book photo and death mask
Photographed by Derek DiMatteo.


Monday, October 1, 2012

Blog 10, Comments for Ming (from Derek)



Ming, I enjoyed reading through your blog entries. I found many of them to be really rich with generative possibilities. For some reason, I really liked the quote clarifying the meaning of illusion: “the word illusion does not mean that it does not exist; rather, an illusion is not what is seems”. While that quote does not necessarily set the tone for the blog, it does potentially link into some of the themes you explore therein.

In the beginning entries, Ming, you seem to be wondering about the performance of gender, especially the differences between performing gender in safe versus unsafe spaces, which I found really intriguing. You write about the definition of safe space as one that can encompass “ruptura” (Freire), which I thought was interesting and wanted to read more about. You then mentioned the performance of the First Lady and wives (in general) as occasional athletes, although I wondered what your thoughts were on this. In the two amusing posts on Tina Fey’s observations about acting (one on observing Alec Baldwin and one on Amy Poehler) you display a continued interest in the difference between performing the Self rather than performing what others want you to. These two Fey posts seem to connect to the Theory of Mind post, but you didn’t really comment much on these three posts, and as I read them I was curious to know why these quotes grabbed you; I wanted to read your thoughts and reactions to the quotes. The post about avatars seemed to continue your earlier theme of performing the Self on stage, but I didn’t understand the references to avatars, which ultimately went unexplained (for me). The post on Kaling seems to have connections with both your interest in performance of gender as well as control over self-performance, but you were focusing on criticizing the Vulture article for its lack of depth and for what you seemed to feel was its attempt to frame the female reader in a gendered role. I thought maybe the Vulture article and the Onion piece were communicating in a more complicated way that I wish you had explored further, and maybe could connect to Kaling’s desire to portray herself as someone in the vein of Tina Fey, and therefore go on to explore what Tina Fey might represent, since she seems to be one of the New Girls that everyone is talking about these days (like you, I’ve been out of the country and out of the loop for many years, so I don’t really know what to make of all these folks). You post On Memorials connected back to Performing Citizenship through the theme of performing patriotism and citizenship, but complicating it through protest; again, I wanted to read more about how these intersect for you. I am personally very interested in this area, so perhaps that’s why I wished to read your thoughts and felt disappointed when you didn’t share them. In your post on Mockingbird, I wondered whether you saw any connection between Tina Fey’s comments about “Real Acting” and your impression of Rodden and Macy’s soulfulness.

As a reader, I was also invited to interact with the blog by the elements you chose to include within it. Elements of the blog that stood out to me as scriptive are the photos of women laughing with salad, or just laughing in groups, mouths open; the image of the pipe “this is not a pipe”; and the hyperlinks to the articles. In terms of performances that these objects entail, I felt like the photos asked me to imagine what the women were laughing at. The image of the pipe and its caption demanded that I pause and try to make sense of the statement. The links to the articles invited me to click and follow. I had to engage with the images in order to fully appreciate the text of the post; likewise with some of the links, some of which I had to follow in order to understand what was being written in the post. I also chose to scroll through the blog in chronological order, which is the reverse of how the blog presents itself to the viewer. In this way perhaps I was resisting the scriptive nature of the blog itself…just a little bit.

Ultimately, this tumblr/blog has a lot of really interesting material in it, and it seems like a good way to keep track of what catches your eye—you seem to be using it to maintain a kind of annotated bibliography of things that matter or interest you, things that could be generative, or things that prompt reflection. I enjoyed scrolling through it, and I will return to view more as the course continues.

Wednesday, September 12, 2012

Response to the Bloggers of Prompt 5


The blog posts were highly engaging, and I’m writing one post to react to them in general, because I saw several connections between them. Regarding sincerity, Jenna draws our attention to the title, suggesting that the audience knows ahead of time that the characters have been dealt an injustice, and the audience is already primed to believe in the characters’ innocence, and thereby judge their words sincere. Audience predisposition indeed seems an important factor. Just as important is the audience’s reaction to the performance itself. Ming, Justin, and Jennifer each pointed to the importance of the telling of the stories, rather than the over-emotionalized recreation or re-living of the events, as essential to the creation of a sense of sincerity within the performance of the play. I felt the same way—that it’s best to just tell the story rather than preach at the audience. Just as Blank and Jensen write “trust the stories” (xvi), I would add trust the audience.

Ming wrote of her reaction to the focus on the dialogue, which showed us that things weren’t fair, thus eliciting an emotional response in her. Justin also wrote about how the play focuses on dialogue, referring to the way Blank and Jensen pointedly do not follow Dawson’s Unity of Piscatorian Stage Devices, suggesting that to cover the stage with realia would have been cliché and resulted in a weakening of the authenticity of the play. I agree—the use of such realia would seem too self-conscious and detract from the story. It might even seem like the director was trying too hard to convince the audience that the stories were real, thus making the audience doubt the “truth” of the performance. The sparse set allows the audience to focus more on the words, the stories of the characters themselves. The audience can see the contradictions and the hypocrisy become apparent through the simplicity; the simplicity enhances the sense of sincerity. The dissonance between what we’re taught about how the system works and the way the system is shown to actually work is thus all the more powerful—especially when this gap is exploited by Rhodes to harm Sunny and Jesse (36). The audience also sees the dissonance they are feeling played out on stage in the characters who trust the system and are betrayed by it, such as Gary (30-31) and Sunny (43). It’s also felt when David’s prosecutor lies (44). The sense of sincerity felt by the audience does indeed contribute to the feeling that what they see is the truth. I’m not sure if Jennifer is equating the two when she writes “sincere/True” in her post, but I can see her point that the play’s simple telling of these six stories, because they are mediated and crafted, is not so different from Herzog manipulating facts to lead an audience to a realization of larger Truths. I’m not sure about the role of humor in creating this effect, but I do like Jennifer’s use of the phrase “dramatic testimony” to describe the play.

Would celebrity actors cause the “dramatic testimony” to feel less sincere? Would celebrity actors make it easier for spectators to “lose [their] sense of these characters as real people”, as Andrea asks? Would celebrity actors be distracting or would using them provide the distance necessary for theatricality? As Jennifer suggests in her post, I think it would draw the audience’s attention to the fact that it’s a set of stories being told to them second hand by actors. Rather than interpreting this as “an unproductive or unpurposeful phenomenological rupture,” as Justin posits in his post, I suggest the opposite: that the recognition of the celebrity would be beneficial because it would prevent the audience from slipping into the error of conflating the actor with the character—and it would thereby create the space necessary for the audience to engage in the process of theatricality. Here’s where the issue of trusting the audience comes up again. Create the conditions for theatricality and trust the audience to make meaning.

This brings us finally to the question of the role of theater, something that Ming deals with in her post. She questions whether people go to the theater “to take part in moral decisions,” asking “why is the best thing about theater a discussion about right and wrong?” She wonders whether this is because theaters are nominally secular cultural sites, in contrast to religious houses of worship such as churches, which therefore allow an audience more freedom to both have a moral reaction and to “consider the reasons why”—and I would add, for themselves. This seems reasonable. From a Marxist perspective, houses of worship seem like they can easily be places where ideological dogma is received uncritically by an already-receptive audience (this is not necessarily the case in reality), whereas a theater is potentially freer of such a dynamic (ideology is present in theater, too), thereby allowing more room for alternatives in terms of what is being presented (no dogma dictates what the priest preaches, or even whether there needs to be any preaching!), and also more room for interpretation, decision-making, and meaning-making by the critically-aware spectator observing the theatricality unfolding before them.