The purpose of Foster’s article is to show the underlying
power structures between the observed and observing bodies. She premises this
argument on eighteenth century French philosophers Condillac and Du Bos’s
conceptions of the body. She then extrapolates those ideas into a Foucauldian
argument regarding Feuillet’s dance notation. She says that the notation
divided bodily movements into approved and controlled motions: “Within such a
space, neutral bodily features and motions, such as those identified by
Feuillet notation, operated to confirm the existence of an absolute set of laws
to which all bodies should conform” (88).
Foster argues that this conception of the body allowed
colonizers to distance themselves from the sympathy generally evoked by another
person. Instead of sharing in their pain as equal beings, the colonizer could
be moved by the plight of the colonized subject and seek to “help” them improve
(87). The sense of sympathy was compromised by the colonizer’s ability to view
the space between them and the body of the Other as under his or her
control/remediation.
She shows the modern repercussions of her argument by
framing her article with a 1971 journal entry by Yvonne Ranier, a choreographer
and filmmaker. According to Foster’s interpretation, the entry shows Ranier’s
unconscious position of power over the Indian performer she was observing (81).
While Foster states that she’s not trying to “catch” Ranier in any way, she
claims that using Ranier as an example allows her to show an unacknowledged
process, one that needs to be interrogated further in order to re-choreograph. Her conceptualization of the observer as
possessing power over the observed is the most useful part of her argument for
our course. Thus far, we have primarily considered the effect of the performance
on the audience, but this reorients that discussion. It also returns us to the
accusatory sections of Artaud’s work, in which the actors accuse the audience:
“You feel the discomfort of being watched and addressed, since you came
prepared to watch and make yourselves comfortable in the shelter of the dark”
(13). This is underlined by our reading of Davis, who explains that the
determination of a performance’s theatricality is in the hands of the audience,
that implies that the audience’s gaze is exerting a form of power on the
performer.
*** Addendum ***
As for the Reason & Reynolds article, I agree with Ming that the authors may be trying to use a data-driven approach to underline truisms (people who have decided beforehand that they don't like ballet, don't like ballet [57]; people respond to dance in a variety of ways; etc.) . They frontload their article with a description of their methods, but they constantly remind their readers that this is not a definitive research method. They question the honesty of the responses, they mention that their study can't be entirely comprehensive, and they note the limitations of their sample. However, within all that, I think their description of kinesthetic empathy is helpful.
Kinesthetic empathy via Reason & Reynolds may actually be a better explanation for Ranier's behavior in the Foster article than the one Foster proposes. While Foster seeks to understand subconscious, historically based cultural responses to performance (Ranier), Reason & Reynolds study the individual: "It was vital in considering what people said about watching dance that we knew the perspectives from which they spoke, including levels of experience in watching dance, of taking dance classes, and dance training, and that we differentiated between different styles of dance" (55). Reason & Reynolds aren't look for deep-seated cultural practices as much as personal life knowledge and training and what impact that has on reception. Their sharing of the audience's responses is helpful and implies a respect for all kinds of viewing, irrespective of that person's cultural capital - a term they borrow usefully from Bordieu.
Also, their sense of the power structure is more complex from Foster's. The viewer is moved by the performer's virtuosity and grace, which implies that the performer holds a sort of power over the viewer (60). However, the viewer's emotional responses to the dance could also be because the viewers are "projecting [their emotional responses] onto the movement" (67). In any event, "experiences of embodied and imaginative connection between the self and the other...can be considered in terms of kinesthetic 'empathy'" (71). This acknowledges that the connection can exist in a positive way, but it need not exist whatsoever. Also, should the connection exist, it need not be a destructive one for either party.
The fact that all of these responses are presented as valid is probably the most useful point for our class. Whether viewers engage in the trance, are offended, or are inspired to a state of stuplimity, each response is appropriate (not like the rube rescuing Desdemona or the misuse of Bernstein's cut-out). Finally, this article does offer one way of studying the repertoire rather than the text - interview those who have experienced it and see what they think.
As for the Reason & Reynolds article, I agree with Ming that the authors may be trying to use a data-driven approach to underline truisms (people who have decided beforehand that they don't like ballet, don't like ballet [57]; people respond to dance in a variety of ways; etc.) . They frontload their article with a description of their methods, but they constantly remind their readers that this is not a definitive research method. They question the honesty of the responses, they mention that their study can't be entirely comprehensive, and they note the limitations of their sample. However, within all that, I think their description of kinesthetic empathy is helpful.
Kinesthetic empathy via Reason & Reynolds may actually be a better explanation for Ranier's behavior in the Foster article than the one Foster proposes. While Foster seeks to understand subconscious, historically based cultural responses to performance (Ranier), Reason & Reynolds study the individual: "It was vital in considering what people said about watching dance that we knew the perspectives from which they spoke, including levels of experience in watching dance, of taking dance classes, and dance training, and that we differentiated between different styles of dance" (55). Reason & Reynolds aren't look for deep-seated cultural practices as much as personal life knowledge and training and what impact that has on reception. Their sharing of the audience's responses is helpful and implies a respect for all kinds of viewing, irrespective of that person's cultural capital - a term they borrow usefully from Bordieu.
Also, their sense of the power structure is more complex from Foster's. The viewer is moved by the performer's virtuosity and grace, which implies that the performer holds a sort of power over the viewer (60). However, the viewer's emotional responses to the dance could also be because the viewers are "projecting [their emotional responses] onto the movement" (67). In any event, "experiences of embodied and imaginative connection between the self and the other...can be considered in terms of kinesthetic 'empathy'" (71). This acknowledges that the connection can exist in a positive way, but it need not exist whatsoever. Also, should the connection exist, it need not be a destructive one for either party.
The fact that all of these responses are presented as valid is probably the most useful point for our class. Whether viewers engage in the trance, are offended, or are inspired to a state of stuplimity, each response is appropriate (not like the rube rescuing Desdemona or the misuse of Bernstein's cut-out). Finally, this article does offer one way of studying the repertoire rather than the text - interview those who have experienced it and see what they think.
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